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CRITICAL NOTE 
REPLY TO HUGLY AND SAYWARD 
Hugly and Sayward [4] argue that a gbt cannot satisfy convention T. I agree. 
So, I assume, would Hartry Field from whom I borrowed the concept [3]. 
The obvious reason for this, as Hugly and Sayward point out, is that a gbt 
provides no machinery for moving from the likes of ‘the predicate “is red” 
applies to x’ to the likes of ‘x is red’. No machinery is provided because 
‘applies to’ is taken as primitive in a gbt. To complain of the lack of machin- 
ery is simply to complain that ‘applies to’ is undefined. 
So what I called an unsupplemented gbt - i.e., a gbt which takes ‘applies 
to’ or some such as primitive - does not, of course, satisfy convention T. Nor 
did I (or Field) claim it did.’ What I did claim is that a gbt supplemented by 
a general definition of application in, say, psychological terms, would satisfy 
convention T. Suppose we have 
(A) x applies (in k) toy iff $xyk 
where ‘4’ is some predicate drawn from psychology. Then from 
(1) 
we have 
‘Vx x is red’ is true in k iff t/x ‘is red’ applies (in k) to x 
(1’) ‘Vx x is red’ is true in k iff W x 4 ‘is red’ xk. 
Now since (A) is evidently acceptable only if we can move from the likes of 
‘4 ‘is red’xk’ to the likes of ‘x is red’, whatever justifies (A) will justify this 
move. Or rather: part of the justification of (A) must be that this sort of 
move is available. Any failure in such a move will disqualify (A). But the 
move in question is just what we need to get from (1’) to (2): 
(2) ‘Vx is red’ is true in k iff V x x is red.2 
Of course, nothing answering to (A) is available for a natural language. 
But then, as I pointed out in ‘Truth and Logical Form’ [ I] , neither is any- 
thing like an fbt available for a natural language. My point was simply that 
the possibility of a truth characterization of a natural language does not 
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presuppose the conditions requisite for an fbt, viz., representability in terms 
of a finite base. 
A final comment: Hugly and Sayward point out that the definition of 
satisfaction in terms of application makes no real explanatory progress. Of 
course not. For most purposes, the shift to application simply marks a shift 
in terminology. My motivation (explicitly stated) was that application can 
be understood to relate tokens (or tokenings) of expressions on the one 
hand and objects on the other. One party to the satisfaction relation is 
always an infinite sequence. Thus application lends itself more readily to 
psychoIogical explanation. (See [2], p. 116.) 
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NOTES 
’ See [l] p. 33. There 1 point out that, unlike a theory satisfying convention T, a gbt 
does not eliminate ‘satisfies’ in favor of the non-semantic. Evidently, any theory satisfy- 
ing convention T would (or could) do this. 
2 Hugly and Sayward may be worried about building in a formal guarantee of the 
move from (1’) to (2). They needn’t. Persuaded of (A), (1’) and its ilk suffice to 
eliminate ‘true in k’ from cannonical contexts, and whatever persuades us of (A) will 
persuade us that the elimination is carried out correctly. What further purpose would 
be served a formai guarantee of the move to (2)? Why should we want or expect to be 
able to express the psychological reduction in the axioms of a truth characterization? 
